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Non-technical summary 
Economic theory suggests that managers’ investment behavior differs from that of owners. On 
the one hand, managers might under-invest into R&D compared to owners for reasons of risk. 
R&D projects are typically risky, long-term investments with a high failure rate. Because 
project failure can have detrimental effects on a manager’s career and eventually lead to job 
loss, managers might under-invest into R&D projects. On the other hand, managers might 
over-invest into R&D compared to owners for reasons of growth. Innovation fosters growth, 
which is found to go along with greater managerial remuneration, power and prestige. 
In reality, however, the concept of manager-led versus owner-led firms turns out to be fuzzy, 
as many managers frequently own shares of their firms. Therefore, the literature discusses 
incentive effects and entrenchment effects. With an increasing amount of company shares 
held by the manager, his behavior becomes more aligned to the owners interest (incentive 
effect). But at the same time ownership shares also result in higher job security for the 
manager and, hence, make him powerful enough to pursue own goals and disregard owners’ 
interests (entrenchment effect). 
In this study, we investigate empirically whether managerial ownership affects a firm’s R&D 
expenditure using a sample of 1,406 Belgian firms. First, we find that managers holding no 
company shares under-invest into innovation when compared to owners giving rise to the risk 
argument. These managers seem to have insufficient incentives to invest into R&D, as they 
fear that project failure could negatively affect their careers. Second, we find an inverse u-
shape relationship between the degree of managerial ownership and R&D expenditure. This 
indicates that managers become entrenched when holding a sufficient amount of company 
shares. Higher job security allows the managers to pursue their own interests, i.e. to over-
invest into innovation for reasons of growth. Due to their ownership shares managers do not 
have to fear detrimental effects on their career in case of project failure. This reduces the risk 
tied to R&D investments while the positive aspects remain.  
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Die Theorie managementgeleiteter Unternehmen geht davon aus, dass sich 
Investitionsentscheidungen von Managern, die zwar ein Unternehmen führen, aber nicht 
besitzen, von denen der Eigner unterscheiden können. Zum einen könnten Manager bei 
Entscheidungen hinsichtlich Forschung und Entwicklung (FuE) aufgrund des damit 
verbundenen hohen Risikos aus Sicht der Eigner zu wenig investieren. FuE-Projekte sind 
typische Beispiele für langfristige und riskante Projekte mit ungewissem Ausgang. Scheitern 
Projekte, so wird sich dies negativ auf die Bewertung des Managers seitens der Eigner 
auswirken und kann schlimmsten Falls sogar zum Arbeitsplatzverlust führen. Zum anderen 
könnten Manager aus Sicht der Eigner auch zu viel in FuE-Projekte investieren, um das 
Unternehmenswachstum zu fördern. Anreiz hierfür ist, dass Wachstum mit einer höheren 
Entlohnung des Managements, Macht und gesellschaftlichem Ansehen einhergeht. 
In der Realität ist die Unterscheidung zwischen Managern und Eignern jedoch nicht trivial, da 
Manager häufig am Unternehmenskapital beteiligt werden. Aus theoretischer Sicht führt 
Anteilseigentum des Managers zu zwei gegenläufigen Effekten. Mit steigendem 
Anteilseigentum nähert sich das Verhalten des Managers dem der Eigner an (Anreiz-Effekt). 
Gleichzeitig führt ein größerer Kapitalanteil des Managers auch zu einer erhöhten 
Arbeitsplatzsicherheit, welche den Manager mächtiger macht und ihm mehr Spielraum gibt 
im eigenen Interesse, nicht aber dem Interesse der anderen Anteilseigner, zu handeln 
(Entrenchment-Effekt). 
In dieser Studie wird auf Basis eines Datensatzes von 1406 belgischen Unternehmen 
untersucht, wie sich eine Kapitalbeteiligung des Managements auf die FuE-Ausgaben 
auswirkt. Manager, die keine Anteile halten, investieren weniger in FuE als Manager, die 
100% der Anteile besitzen. Dies weist darauf hin, dass Manager versuchen das Risiko des 
Scheiterns eines FuE-Projekts mit den entsprechenden negativen Auswirkungen auf ihre 
Karriere zu reduzieren, d.h. sie haben unzureichende Anreize in FuE zu investieren. Weiterhin 
finden wir einen invers u-förmigen Verlauf zwischen Managereigentum und der Höhe der 
FuE-Ausgaben. Hält ein Manager einen hinreichend großen Anteil am Unternehmen, so nutzt 
er diese Möglichkeit, um aus Sicht der anderen Eigentümer zu viel für FuE aufzuwenden. 
Aufgrund des eigenen Unternehmensbesitzes müssen Manager bei Scheitern eines Projektes 
weniger um ihren Arbeitsplatz fürchten, was bedeutet, dass FuE-Investitionen für sie in 
geringerem Maße Risiken darstellen, wohingegen die positiven Aspekte bestehen bleiben. 
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Abstract 
Principle-agent theory suggests managers might under-invest into R&D for reasons of risk 
tied to project failure, such as reduced remuneration and job loss. However, managers might 
over-invest into innovation for reasons of growth implying higher remuneration, power and 
prestige. Using a sample of 1,406 Belgian firms, we find, first, that managers holding no 
company shares under-invest into R&D compared to owners giving rise to the risk argument. 
Second, we find an inverse u-shaped relationship between the degree of managerial ownership 
and R&D. Thus, managers become entrenched, i.e. powerful enough to pursue their own 
interests. When entrenched, managers do not fear detrimental effects of risky innovation projects 
on their career, and hence tend to over-invest into innovation. 
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1 Introduction 
In industrialized economies, many companies are not owner-led but manager-led which 
causes the well known principal-agent problem. The principal-agent problem arises from 
different interests of the manager and the owner in combination with information 
asymmetries (cf. Berle and Means 1932, Holmström and Milgrom 1987). As a manager 
cannot be completely monitored by an owner, he is expected to lead the company less 
efficient than an owner, as he maximizes his own utility and not necessarily the firm’s profits. 
It is likely that differences in leadership also affect a firm’s investment into innovation. 
Holmström (1989) analyzed this relationship theoretically. He concludes that leadership 
structure affects R&D investments as agency costs associated with innovation – i.e. an 
investment into risky and long-term projects – are high. Even though innovation projects 
might lead to potentially high rewards, he argues that managers under-invest into innovation 
compared to owners due to the risk associated with those projects. Innovation projects face a 
high risk of failure which can have detrimental effects on a manager’s career and eventually 
lead to job loss (see also Zwiebel 1995). Besides, a risk-averse manager has the incentive to 
reallocate resources to less risky projects, in order to reduce the volatility of his flexible wage 
component that depends on company profits.  
In contrast to the risk-argument stands the growth-argument which states that managers 
have an incentive to over-invest into R&D compared to owners. A manager’s wage is 
positively correlated with company size (Baker et al. 1988, Murphy 1985). As innovation 
fosters growth (e.g. Aghion and Howitt 1997, 2009, Abramowitz 1989), higher R&D 
investments might positively affect a manager’s remuneration. This might incentivize 
managers to over-invest into innovation relative to the interests of the owners. Besides, 
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managers have non-monetary incentives to invest into innovation such as status, power, 
prestige, and that innovation is positively valued in public. 
Recent literature on corporate governance also highlights another factor that should be 
taken into account when investigating the impact of leadership structures. Most firms are not 
purely owner-led or manager-led but managers hold some shares of the firm. Thus, the 
question on how managerial decision processes affect the firm may depend on their degree of 
ownership. Among others, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Morck et al. (2005) have 
discussed the existence and relevance of so-called incentive effects and entrenchment effects 
in the context of firm performance. 
Depending on the ownership share, the principal-agent problem may result in different 
decision making behavior. Increasing ownership shares may entail an incentive effect, that is, 
the manager behaves more like an owner. But at the same time the manager may become 
entrenched, i.e. is powerful enough to use his discretion in own interests rather than pursuing 
the owners’ goals. Clearly, entrenchment will exert a particularly strong impact if risk of 
dismissal is highly relevant. This in turn is the case if activities pursued by managers have a 
high risk of failure and the cause of the failure cannot be identified. This is true for 
innovation projects, where the owners usually are unable to identify the reason for failure of 
one or more innovation projects and make the managers responsible for it. Hence in the case 
of innovation activities entrenchment might exert a particularly strong effect on managers’ 
behavior. 
Surprisingly the topic of managerial entrenchment has rarely been studied in the 
context of innovation.1 We only know of a singly study by Cosh et al. (2007), who find 
managerial entrenchment in combination with a firm’s innovative efficiency. In contrast, we 
                                                 
1
 Aghion et al. (2009) touch upon this issue in a study where they investigate the relationship between 
innovation and institutional ownership. They compare scenarios with different entrenchment levels of managers 
and find that the positive effect of institutional ownership on innovation is stronger when managers are less 
entrenched. 
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investigate in this paper how different levels of managerial ownership influence innovation 
investment decisions of firms. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The second section briefly reviews 
the empirical literature on innovation and corporate governance and then discusses the 
entrenchment and incentive effect. Section three introduces data and methods and the fourth 
section presents the results. The final section concludes. 
2 Literature review and theoretical background 
2.1 Corporate governance and innovation: evidence on risk versus growth effects 
Surprisingly, there is only little empirical research on the link between corporate governance 
and innovation. The majority of studies find that management control or managerial 
ownership has a positive effect on a firm’s innovative activity supporting the risk argument 
(Hill and Snell 1989, Baysinger et al. 1991, Francis and Smith 1995, Lee and O’Neil 2003, 
Honoso et al. 2004, Makri et al. 2006, Lerner and Wulf 2007, Aghion et al. 2009, Lhuillery 
2009, Lerner et al. 2010)2. Other studies demonstrate that managers tend to over-invest into 
innovation compared to owners supporting the growth-argument (Czarnitzki and Kraft 
2004a/b and 2009, Munari et al. 2005, Hall and Oriani 2006). 
Most of these studies use information on the stock ownership concentration or the 
existence of large shareholders to measure a firm’s corporate governance structure (Hill and 
Snell 1989, Baysinger et al. 1991, Francis and Smith 1995, Lee and O’Neil 2003, Honoso et 
al. 2004, Munari et al. 2005, Hall and Oriani 2006, Czarnitzki and Kraft 2004a/2009).3 Only 
                                                 
2
 See also Eisenmann (2002) who finds a positive relationship between CEO equity ownership and risk-
taking propensity for the U.S. cable television industry.  
3
 Other studies focus on different ownership issues. Aghion et al. (2009) show that institutional 
ownership positively influences R&D investments. Lhuillery (2009) considers governance structures of French 
firms that are designed in order to defend shareholders’ rights and finds that shareholders’ rights positively 
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a few studies use information on managerial ownership as a measurement of inter-firm 
differences in leadership, as we do in this paper (Francis and Smith 1995, Czarnitzki and 
Kraft 2004a/b). These studies employ dummy variables to measure the impact of managerial 
ownership on innovation. Czarnitzki and Kraft (2004a) compare firms led by managers who 
own no shares with those who are led by owners. They find that owner-led firms have a lower 
R&D intensity. If a major stockholder exists, the differences between manager-led and 
owner-led firms disappear. Czarnitzki and Kraft (2004b) find that firms led by an owner or a 
member of the owner’s family have significantly less successful innovations. Interestingly 
Francis and Smith (1995) find the opposite, that is firms with a high concentration of 
management ownership (>30% of ownership shares) or a significant equity block held by an 
outside investor are more innovative than firms with widely held stock. 
In contrast to most of the existing literature, we employ a continuous measure of 
managerial ownership which allows us to investigate the relationship between the degree of 
capital ownership and innovation in detail. Besides analyzing whether the risk effect 
outweighs the growth effect when it comes to investments of the management into 
innovation, this allows us to analyze potential managerial entrenchment in the context of 
innovation. 
2.2 Managerial Ownership: incentive versus entrenchment effects 
When studying how the level of managerial ownership influences firm performance two 
opposing forces come into place: the incentive and the entrenchment effect (Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997, Morck et al. 2005). Firstly, it is expected that with increasing stake ownership 
                                                                                                                                                        
affect R&D intensity. Makri et al. (2006) find that technology-intensive firms can be more effective if they base 
CEO incentives on a combination of short-term financial results (ROE) and behavioral indicators of long-term 
innovation quality. Lerner and Wulf (2007) show for the US publicly traded companies that in centralized R&D 
organizations more long-term incentives, such as stock options, go along with more heavily cited patents, more 
frequent awards, and patents of greater originality. And Lerner et al. (2010) find that patents of private equity-
backed up firms applied for in the years after the investment are more frequently cited.  
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of the company a manager’s interest should be more aligned to those of an owner (incentive 
effect). Secondly, the more shares a manager holds, the less power the other owners of the 
company have upon a manager’s decisions (entrenchment effect). This allows managers to 
undertake specific investments complementing their own skills which at the same time 
strengthens their bargaining power and makes them hard to replace (see also Shleifer and 
Vishny 1989). Higher job security allows a manager to entrench behind his increased 
bargaining power and pursue strategies to enrich himself at the expense of the company or 
other shareholder’s wealth. Hence, both the incentive and the entrenchment effect come into 
play with increasing managerial ownership, but oppose each other.  
Empirical research on the effect of entrenchment on firm performance shows that the 
incentive effect is offset by the entrenchment effect beyond a certain level implying that a 
high degree of managerial ownership affects company performance negatively. These studies 
frequently find a non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
performance (see Shleifer and Vishny 1997, Morck et al. 2005, and Adams et al. 2010 for 
comprehensive overviews about the entrenchment literature).4 Most of the empirical research 
on entrenchment dates back to the work of Morck et al. (1988) who find a positive correlation 
between management ownership and Tobin’s Q in the 0% to 5% ownership range, a negative 
relationship from 5% to 25%, and again positive levels when management ownership exceeds 
25%.5 Other studies find a non-linear relationship in form of an inverted u-shape (McConell 
and Servaes 1990, Gugler et al. 2008).  
In the context of innovation Cosh et al. (2007) show based on a sample of British SMEs 
that CEO ownership positively affects innovative efficiency at low levels of ownership until 
                                                 
4
 At what level managers become entrenched seems not clear from those studies. Demsetz and Villalonga 
(2001) demonstrate well that the studies on insider shares and firm performance do not find a common pattern. 
5
 These findings have been verified by Kole (1995). 
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it peaks at about 65 to 68% of ownership after which the effect turns negative.6 Besides, 
Wright et al. (1996) find that the relationship between insider ownership and corporate risk 
taking is positive at low levels of insider ownership while it becomes negative at high levels.7 
R&D is possibly the most prominent example for a risky investment. Once R&D is expensed, 
it is basically sunk, as it mainly consists of wages for R&D personnel. In addition, the returns 
from R&D are highly uncertain, and some R&D projects may simply fail to deliver any 
usable result for the company.  
In this study, we investigate the influence of managerial ownership on R&D 
investments, as most innovation projects require a firm to invest in R&D. It is likely that at 
various levels of managerial ownership the potential for entrenchment will differently 
influence managers’ attitudes towards investments into innovation. As managers might 
become entrenched at high levels of ownership, we expect the relationship between 
managerial ownership and innovation not to be of a linear, but a non-linear form. 
2.3 Identifying risk and growth as well as incentive and entrenchment effects 
In order to make predictions on the direction of the effect of managerial ownership, we have 
to clearly define managerial ownership and use some level of R&D investment as benchmark. 
For instance, one could safely argue that an owner-led company is a firm where the manager 
or the board of managers owns 100% of the shares. In the empirical literature, however, 
“owners” are sometimes defined as managers that (a) own any share of the firm, (b) own 
some non-negligible share (e.g. more than 25%), (c) are majority owners (i.e. more than 
50%) or (d) persons (incl. families) that wholly own a firm.  
                                                 
6
 Cosh et al. (2007) measure innovative (output-oriented) efficiency by data envelopment and stochastic 
frontier analysis. They measure innovation output by the percentage of sales with new or significantly improved 
products. Inputs include R&D expenditure as percentage of sales and the number of R&D personnel as a share 
of the total labor force. 
7
 Wright et al. (1996: 451) use the standard deviation of analysts' forecasts of earnings per share as a 
measure of risk, because uncertainty in analysts' forecasts should be highly correlated with the unpredictability 
in cash flows generated by a firm's assets, which are a result of corporate risk-taking behavior. 
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Theoretically, it would be most appropriate to presume that a “purely” owner-led firm 
is one where the manager owns 100% of the firm, and that such firms invest at profit-
maximizing levels of factor inputs. Taking this investment level as point of reference, we can 
define a “purely” manager-led firm as a firm where the manager owns 0% of the shares. In 
between 0% and 100% ownership, the concept of manager-led versus owner-led becomes 
fuzzy. 
Applying this concept, we can first identify whether “pure” managers with no equity 
shares deviate from the level of R&D investment of “pure” owners with 100% equity shares 
because of the principal-agent problem. The direction of the deviation from the profit-
maximizing level is a-priori unclear. On the one hand, “pure managers” may invest more than 
“pure owners”, as they are typically rewarded by a combination of firm size (or growth) and 
profitability. On the other hand, they may invest less, because of the arguments concerning 
risk of failure with regard to R&D projects. Therefore a “pure” manager may under-invest 
into R&D as the risk of project failure is too high and appropriation in case of success is 
limited.  
Second, we can identify the balance between managerial entrenchment and incentive 
effects. According to the incentive effect we would expect the interests of managers 
converging to those of an owner with increasing equity stakes. If managers become 
entrenched, however, they may deviate from the interest of an owner as their equity stakes 
increase. If the investment level departs from the purely owner-led firms as managerial 
ownership increases, one can conclude that the entrenchment effect outweighs the incentive 
effect. Second, if the investment level converges towards the purely owner-led firms, one can 
conclude that incentive effects outweigh potential entrenchment effects. Thus, we are 
interested in the slope of the curve describing the relationship between investment level and 
ownership shares to conclude on managerial entrenchment versus incentive effects.  
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In contrast, the level of the investment of “pure managers” compared to the level of 
investment of “pure owners” will indicate whether the risk argument, i.e. managers invest 
less, or the growth argument, i.e. managers invest more than purely owner-led firms, applies 
on average, all else constant. 
3 Data 
3.1 Sample 
We use firm level data from the Flemish part of the sixth Community Innovation Survey 
(CIS) collected in 2009. The CIS is a business survey collecting firm-level data on innovation 
inputs and outputs. It is to a large extent harmonized across European Member States (see 
Eurostat 2004 for a detailed description of the CIS at European level). The CIS conducted in 
2009 covers the innovative activity of companies between 2006 and 2008. It also provides 
general information on the company, such as sales, the number of employees, export share, 
and the sector of economic activity. We add firm-level financial data from Bel-First, a 
database provided by Bureau van Dijk that contains detailed financial information such as 
capital intensity, cash-flow and leverage.8 The final database includes information on a cross-
section of 1,406 firms that are active in manufacturing and selected service industries.9 It 
constitutes a representative sample of these sectors in the economy of Flanders, Belgium. 
3.2 Variable description 
As discussed above, we analyze whether the company stakes a manager owns influence his 
decision to invest into innovation. As a measure of a firm’s investments into innovation we 
                                                 
8
 The overlap of the companies in the Flemish CIS 2009 and Bel-First database is almost 100%. We lose 
only 12 observations when including the financial information provided by Bel-First. 
9
 Selected service industries include NACE Ref.2 industries G, H, J, and M (see Table 4 in the appendix). 
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observe a firm’s R&D expenditure in 2008. The distribution of R&D expenditure is highly 
skewed, and many firms do not invest into R&D at all. In our sample the mean of R&D 
expenditure is 0.8 million EUR, while the median company does not conduct any R&D. 
Because of the skewness of the distribution, we use the logarithm of R&D investment in 2008 
(lnRD) as dependent variable (Table 1).10 In order to check the robustness of our results 
concerning the measure of investments into R&D, we also look at R&D intensity, i.e. the 
relation of a firm’s R&D expenditure compared to its turnover in 2008. R&D intensity takes 
values between 0 and 100%. 
We measure managerial ownership in two different ways. First, we employ dummy 
variables to compare “pure” owners, i.e. managers that are 100% owners (MAN100), and 
managers that own more than 0 but less than 100% (MAN1-99), with “pure” managers that 
hold no company shares. MAN100 takes on the value 1 if a manager owns 100% of the 
company shares between 2006 and 2008, and 0 otherwise. MAN1-99 takes on the value 1 if a 
manager owns more than 0 but less than 100% of the company shares between 2006 and 
2008, and 0 otherwise.  
Second, we are interested in the continuous relationship between the degree of 
ownership and the level of R&D spending. Therefore we employ a continuous variable that 
reflects the percentage of the shares the management owned of the company between 2006 
and 2008. SHARE can take on values between 0 and 100%. We also employ its square  to 
allow for a non-linear effect due to managerial entrenchment. Table 1 shows that managers in 
the sample hold on average 25% of company shares. Figure 1 displays the distribution of 
managerial ownership in our sample. We see that managerial ownership clusters at 0, 50 and 
100%. However, a closer look at the distribution of managers’ shares, which are greater than 
                                                 
10
 As many companies have an R&D expnditure of zero, we take the logarithm of R&D expenditure plus 
one, so that the logarithm of R&D expenditure (lnRD) will be zero, if a firm does not invest into R&D. 
Equivalently we could have replaced lnRD by the minimum value of lnRD, if the R&D expenditure equals to 
zero, which leads to similar results. 
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0 and smaller than 100%, demonstrates that there are sufficient observations for all levels of 
managerial ownership (see Figure 2). 
Figure 1: Distribution of managerial ownership between 0 and 100% 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of managerial ownership over 0 and under 100% 
 
We control for firm size, as managerial ownership is correlated with firm size (Bitler et 
al. 2005) and firm size also determines a firms investments into innovation (Schumpeter 
1950, Cohen and Levin 1989). We measure firm size as the number of employees in 2006. 
Due to the skewness of its distribution the variable enters the regression in a log-linear form 
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(lnEMP). To allow for a non-linear effect between firm size and R&D investments, we 
include the squared term of lnEMP, too.  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics (N = 1,406) 
Variable Unit measurement Mean Std. dev. Median Min Max 
R&D expenditure 1000 EUR 788.353 5238.206 0 0 109194 
lnRD Log(R&D expend. + 1) 2.102 2.983 0 0 11.6 
R&D intensity % 3.068 10.110 0    0 100 
MAN100 Dummy 0.182 .386 0    0 1 
MAN1-99 Dummy 0.196 .397 0 0 1 
SHARE % 25.484 40.277 0    0 100 
GROUP Dummy 0.506 0.500 0    0 1 
CAPINT 1000 EUR / employee 40.755 50.726 25.5 0.370 424.4 
LIAB % 0.640 0.210 0.660 0.092 1 
CF/EMP 1000 EUR / employee 20.147 27.195 14 -79.5 209.2 
EXPORT % 30.588 35.226 13 0 100 
C1 Dummy 0.344 0.475 0 0 1 
C2 Dummy 0.262 0.440 0 0 1 
C3 Dummy 0.347 0.476 0 0 1 
EMP  Head counts 100.019 340.721 27    1 6078 
AGE Years 28.389 23.714 21    1 227 
Note: Industry dummies omitted. 
 
Managerial ownership might also differ between firm consortia versus family 
businesses. It is argued that institutional ownership provides effective monitoring and 
encourages managers to pursue risky projects like innovations, as they do not need to fear 
harsh penalty or job loss in case the project fails (Aghion et al. 2009). Therefore we employ a 
dummy variable (GROUP) that takes on the value 1, if a firm was member of a group of 
companies between 2006 and 2008. 
In addition, we include the company’s liability (LIAB) and cash flow per employee 
(CF/EMP) in the regression analysis to capture potential market discipline of managers by 
financial constraints as well as internal resources as these are the primary source for funding 
R&D investments (see e.g. the survey by Hall and Lerner 2010). LIAB is measured as the 
percentage of the current and non-current liabilities in total assets of a firm. CF/EMP is 
measured as cash flow (in thd. EUR) per employee. We also include a firm’s capital intensity 
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(CAPINT), measured as tangible assets (in thd. EUR) per employee. It serves as a signal for 
the market entry cost or also potential technological opportunities in the innovation process. 
We use information about liability, cash flow intensity and capital intensity from 2007, a pre-
sample period, to circumvent endogeneity issues. When information on one of these variables 
is missing in 2007 we impute the information of 2006, or respectively 2005. 
We also control for market structure as this may affect the investment into innovation 
(see e.g. Gilbert 2006). We include the number of competitors in the firm’s most important 
market in terms of turnover. This is measured by three dummy variables: C1 contains firms 
that have between 4 and 6 competitors in their most important market, C2 those that have 7 to 
15 competitors, and C3 firms with more than 15 competitors. The reference category is firms 
in a monopoly or tight oligopoly with up to 3 competitors. In addition, we use the firm-level 
share of exports in total sales (EXPORT) in 2008 to proxy the degree of international 
competition the firm is facing.  
The companies’ age in 2008 serves as a proxy for a firm’s market experience and 
reputation. It also reflects the firm’s ability to access financial sources, which influences a 
company’s innovative activity (Schneider and Veugelers 2010). Therefore we include age 
(AGE) in the analysis and control for a potentially non-linear effect of age on R&D 
expenditure by including the square of age as well.  
Eleven sector dummies capture different technological opportunities of the companies 
and other unobserved factors that vary across industries (see Table 4 in the appendix). 
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3.3 Econometric model 
We estimate a Tobit model, as 884 firms in the sample of 1406 companies do not invest into 
R&D, i.e. those observations are left censored at zero. The Tobit model can be written as 
follows (cf. e.g. Greene 2003) 
(1)    ∗ =  + 	     with     	 ~ (0, ) 
where ∗ is the unobserved latent variable,  is the vector of parameters which has to be 
estimated,  represents the vector of explanatory variables, and 	 is the error term. We 
observe 
(2)     =   
∗          ∗ > 0
 0         ℎ

 
The corresponding likelihood function for the homoscedastic model Tobit model is 
(3)    ln ! =  ∑ − $%&'(  )ln(2+) + ln  +  
(%&,-&./)0
10 2 +  ∑ 34 )1 − Φ(
-&./
1 )2%&7(  
where  is the standard deviation to be estimated and Φ indicates the cumulative density 
function of the standard normal distribution. 
We estimate two different model specifications to analyze the impact of managerial 
ownership on R&D investment. First, we estimate a model employing dummy variables, 
where we compare firms managed by “pure owners” (MAN100) which we assume to behave 
profit-maximizing, and manager that own some company shares (MAN1-99) with those of 
“pure” managers (the reference category). The relationship is described in equation (4) 
below. We can thus test if owner-led companies’ R&D investments differ from that of 
manager-led ones.  
(4)    3489∗ =  $ +  :;1⎼99 + > :;100 + ? @43 +  	 
? symbols a vector of coefficients of the further controls: size, liability, cash flow intensity, 
capital intensity, export intensity, the number of competitors, age, and industry. 
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In our second model we employ the continuous measure of managerial ownership 
SHARE and its square to test for a non-linear relationship between the degree of managerial 
ownership and R&D expenditure, see equation (5).  
(5)    3489∗ =  $ +  AB;8C + > AB;8C + ? @43 + 	 
If various levels of managerial ownership lead to different behavior of the management 
towards R&D investments, we should see a non-linear relationship between R&D 
expenditure and managerial ownership, indicating managerial entrenchment. 
If heteroskedasticity occurs in the Tobit model, the homoscedastic model will lead to 
inconsistent estimates for both the standard errors and the coefficients. In order to correct for 
heteroskedasticity in the Tobit model, one has to model heteroskedasticity in the maximum 
likelihood estimation, as the variance σ2 is estimated as parameter along with the coefficients 
β. We consider a Tobit model with multiplicative heteroskedasticity (cf. Greene 2003). We 
replace the homoscedastic standard error σ by  
 =  Dexp (HI),  
where zi denotes a vector of variables suspected to cause the heteroskedasticity and α is a 
vector of additional parameters to be estimated. We check for heteroskedasticity due to size 
and industry including four size class dummies, based on the number of employees of the 
firms in the sample, and ten industry dummies in zi. Conducting Wald tests on joint 
significance of the size class dummies and the joint significance of the industry dummies, we 
find heteroscedasticity due to industry, but not due to size, for both of our model 
specifications. Consequently, we model the heteroskedastic variance with industry dummies 
and only present the results of the heteroskedastic Tobit models.  
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4 Results 
Table 2 provides the estimation results for the heteroscedastic Tobit, where managerial 
ownership is measured in form of dummy variables. Column (1) presents the results for the 
first model, where we compare R&D expenditure of firms that are led by a “pure” owner 
(MAN100) or other degrees of managerial ownership (MAN1-99) with our reference category 
of “pure” managers that hold no company shares. Column (2) contains the results for the 
second model where we employ the continuous measure of managerial ownership and test for 
a non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and investments into R&D. 
We find that firms, which are led by a “pure” owner (MAN100), as well as managers 
that own more than 0 but less than 100% of the ownership shares (MAN1-99), invest 
significantly more into R&D than firms led by a “pure” manager (see Table 2, Column 1). 
This result supports the theory that “pure” managers face high costs investing into risky R&D 
projects and therefore under-invest into innovation compared to managers that own any 
company shares. Hence, “pure” managers that own no company shares seem to have 
insufficient incentives to invest into risky, long-term R&D projects. This result is robust to a 
different model specification where we employ R&D intensity instead of the logarithm of 
R&D expenditure. We again find that owner-led companies have a significantly higher R&D 
intensity than “purely” manager-led companies (see Table 5, Column 1 in the appendix). 
In addition, the estimation results of model one show that the coefficient of MAN100 is 
smaller than the coefficient of MAN1-99 (see Table 2, Column 1). This indicates, all else 
equal, that there is a non-linear relationship between various degrees of managerial 
ownership and R&D investments suggesting that managers are entrenched when it comes to 
investments into innovation. 
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Table 2: Heteroscedastic Tobit regression results for lnRD 
Model                                      (1)     (2)     
 Coef. Coef. 
 (Std. err) (Std. err) 
MAN1-99 1.792 ***             
                                           (0.433)                 
MAN100 1.062 **              
                                           (0.504)                 
SHARE                0.094 *** 
                                                       (0.024)     
SHARE2/100               -0.088 *** 
                                                       (0.024)     
GROUP    0.116        0.159     
                                           (0.425)     (0.433)     
LIAB 2.045 **  1.974 **  
                                           (0.863)     (0.863)     
CAPINT    0.005        0.005     
                                           (0.004)     (0.004)     
CF/EMP    0.008        0.009     
                                           (0.007)     (0.007)     
C1   -0.792 **    -0.759 **  
                                           (0.384)     (0.384)     
C2   -0.417       -0.408     
                                           (0.406)     (0.406)     
C3 -1.735 *** -1.752 *** 
                                           (0.407)     (0.408)     
EXPORT    0.042 ***    0.042 *** 
                                           (0.005)     (0.005)     
lnEMP    0.204        0.142     
                                           (0.420)     (0.420)     
(lnEMP)2    0.163 ***    0.171 *** 
                                           (0.049)     (0.049)     
AGE   -0.019       -0.015     
                                           (0.017)     (0.017)     
AGE2/100    0.015        0.012     
                                           (0.013)     (0.013)     
Constant -7.332 *** -7.155 *** 
                                           (1.434)     (1.433)     
Test on joint significance of industry 
dummies, χ2(10) 68.21*** 66.66*** 
Log-likelihood -2038.854 -2039.235 
McFadden R2 0.098 0.098 
Number of obs. 1406 1406 
Left-censored obs. 884 884 
Notes: *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%).  
Indeed our second model specification in Column (2) demonstrates that there is a 
highly significant non-linear relationship in form of an inverse u-shape between the amount 
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of capital shares the management owns and R&D investments. The peak is at 54% of the 
shares owned by the management. The relationship is depicted in Figure 3. We see that R&D 
investments do not monotonically rise with increasing ownership shares of the management. 
Instead, R&D initially grows but then decreases as managers expand their equity holdings 
beyond some threshold. 
Figure 3: The inverse u-shape relationship between a firm’s R&D investment (lnRD) and the % 
of capital shares a manager owns (SHARE) 
 
 
The quadratic specification allows a more detailed interpretation of the regression 
results as our previous specification using the dummy variables. First, we see that managers 
owning a relatively small share of the firm under-invest when compared to “pure” owners 
(see the dotted horizontal line in Figure 3). In this range of the ownership we thus conclude 
that the risk argument outweighs the growth argument as the level of investment is lower. As 
in the dummy variable specification, we also see that over-investment is present over a large 
range of the distribution (all observations above the dotted horizontal line). Here the interest 
in growth opportunities outweighs the fear of innovation project failure. Increased job 
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security due to the possession of higher stakes in the firm reduces the managers’ fear that 
R&D project failure can negatively affect his career. More stakes give rise to the growth 
argument that is tied to higher managerial remuneration, power and prestige. 
In addition to the vertical location of the curve, we can also interpret the shape of the 
curve, i.e. the slope. The upward sloping part of the curve – below the dotted horizontal line 
in Figure 3 – indicates that managers’ interests become more aligned with those of the 100% 
owners’ with increasing ownership shares. Above the dotted horizontal line the investment 
level departs further and further away from the 100% owners’ investment, indicating that 
entrenchment effects outweigh the opposing incentive effects. The downward sloping part 
after the peak, that is, managerial interests become more aligned to owners, points to the 
dominance of the incentive effect in this part of the ownership distribution. The results 
remain robust to a different model specification, when we analyze the relationship between 
managerial ownership and R&D intensity (cf. Table 5, Column 2 in the appendix).  
Besides, the estimation results show that larger enterprises invest more into R&D than 
smaller ones, which might be due to the fact that smaller companies have insufficient access 
to financial resources. Firms that export have a higher R&D expenditure, reflecting a positive 
effect of international competition on innovation. However, this result could also be due to 
the fact that Belgium is a small European economy and therefore innovative companies are 
likely to export. Higher liability seems to affect the R&D expenditure positively. High 
competition in the market of the product with the highest turnover has a negative impact on a 
firms R&D expenditure when compared to a close oligopoly, where firms face a maximum of 
three competitors. Being part of a company group, capital intensity, cash flow per employee, 
and company age do not significantly impact R&D expenditure in the present sample.  
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Robustness of results 
As it often criticized that innovations in the service sector are fundamentally distinct 
from those in the manufacturing sector, we conducted another robustness check of the results 
by estimating the same models on a subsample of 778 manufacturing firms. The regression 
results are displayed in Table 3. Our result that “pure” managers seem to under-invest into 
innovation compared to owners holds (cf. Table 3, Column 1). However, when we compare 
“pure” managers only to “pure owners” the effect is still positive but not significant any 
more. Second, the inverse u-form relationship between the degree of managerial ownership 
and the logarithm of R&D investments remains highly significant for the subsample of 
manufacturing industries (cf. Table 3, Column 2). Our finding that managers seem to be 
entrenched when it comes to investments into innovation holds for the subsample of 
manufacturing industries. 
Nevertheless, our results have to be interpreted with caution as they could be subject to 
endogeneity, if ownership is not exogenous but determined by economic forces (Demsetz 
1983, Demsetz and Lehn 1985). Because it may be optimal to wider disperse capital shares in 
a risky environment, the risk structure of a firm could determine its ownership structure. But 
we believe that our model specification rules out potential endogeneity problems to a certain 
extent, as our data on managerial ownership is an average over the years 2006 to 2008, while 
we use information about R&D spending in 2008. Besides, La Porta et al. (1999) state that 
ownership changes very slowly over time. Of course, it would be desirable to employ 
instrumental variable regressions to rule out potential endogeneity more convincingly. 
Unfortunately, we do not have suitable candidates for instrumental variables in our data. 
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Table 3: Tobit regressions for lnRD: subsample of manufacturing industries11 
Model                                      (1)     (2)     
 Coef. Coef. 
 (Std. err.) (Std. err.) 
MAN1-99 1.195 **              
                                           (0.543)                 
MAN100    0.865                 
                                           (0.638)                 
SHARE                0.090 *** 
                                                       (0.030)     
SHARE2/100               -0.084 *** 
                                                       (0.031)     
GROUP    0.371        0.505     
                                           (0.541)     (0.555)     
LIAB 1.981 *   1.892 *   
                                           (1.038)     (1.035)     
CAPINT    0.000        0.000     
                                           (0.005)     (0.005)     
CF/EMP    0.014 *      0.014 *   
                                           (0.009)     (0.009)     
C1   -0.815 *     -0.737     
                                           (0.479)     (0.479)     
C2   -0.395       -0.366     
                                           (0.505)     (0.505)     
C3 -1.482 *** -1.428 *** 
                                           (0.521)     (0.520)     
EXPORT    0.039 ***    0.038 *** 
                                           (0.006)     (0.006)     
lnEMP    0.197        0.143     
                                           (0.569)     (0.567)     
(lnEMP)2    0.174 ***    0.180 *** 
                                           (0.063)     (0.063)     
AGE   -0.026       -0.022     
                                           (0.020)     (0.020)     
AGE2/100    0.022        0.019     
                                           (0.015)     (0.015)     
Constant -6.726 *** -6.694 *** 
                                           (1.650)     (1.646)     
Test on joint significance of industry 
dummies, χ2(10) 1.24 1.30 
Log-likelihood -1208.977 -1207.045 
McFadden R2 0.097 0.098 
Number of obs. 778 778 
Left-censored obs. 460 460 
Notes: *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
                                                 
11
 We employ a homoscedastic Tobit model, as we do not find heteroscedasticity due to firm size or 
industry when analyzing the subsample of manufacturing industries. 
21 
 
5 Conclusion 
This paper considers the impact of managerial ownership on investments into innovation. We 
find first that managers holding no company shares tend to under-invest into innovation when 
compared owners holding 100% of the shares. This gives rise to the theory that managers 
holding no company shares face high agency-costs when it comes to investments into R&D. 
Innovation projects are risky and can thus have detrimental effects on a manager’s career in 
the case of failure and eventually lead to job loss. 
Second, we consider that managers can become entrenched when holding an increasing 
amount of company shares, i.e. they have the freedom to pursue their own – not the owners’ – 
interest. We find a strong non-linear relationship in shape of an inverse u between the 
company shares a manager holds and R&D expenditure, suggesting that managers are 
entrenched when it comes to investments into innovation. Our results indicate that managerial 
entrenchment allows managers to over-invest into innovation when compared to a 100% 
owner. With increasing ownership shares managers face higher job security reducing the fear 
that R&D project failure could negatively affect their career. Hence, managers might over-
invest into innovation for reasons of company growth that goes along with higher managerial 
remuneration as well as increased power and prestige. These findings are in line with the 
theory about ownership structure and innovative activity of firms as well as the entrenchment 
literature.  
Further research analyzing the relationship between managerial ownership and 
innovation is needed in order to check the validity of our findings. Especially the use of 
appropriate instruments for managerial ownership would contribute to gaining further 
insights in this new research field. If, however, managers do become entrenched with 
increasing ownership shares when it comes to investments into R&D, the policy of 
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incentivizing managers to act in the owners’ interests by distributing capital shares to the 
management has to be revisited. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 4: Classification of industry dummies (N = 1,406) 
# Industry definition according to NACE Ref.2 Sector 
classification  
No. of 
observations 
Manufacturing industries 
1 Food, beverages, and tobacco CA: 10-12 112 
2 Textiles and leather CB: 13, 14, 15 52 
3 Wood, paper, and printing CC: 16-18 51 
4 Coke, refineries, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals CD-CF: 19-21 70 
5 Rubber, plastic, and other non-metallic mineral products CG: 22, 23 112 
6 Computer, electronic and optical products CI: 26 123 
7 Electrical equipment, machinery, motor vehicles, trailers 
and other transport equipment, furniture 
CJ-CM: 27- 31 258 
 
Service industries 
8 Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 
G: 45-47 214 
9 Transportation and storage H: 49-53 157 
10 Information and communication J: 58-63 132 
11 Professional, scientific and technical activities M: 69-75 125 
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Table 5: Heteroscedastic Tobit regression results for RDINT 
Model                                      (1)     (2)     
 Coef. Coef. 
 (Std. err.) (Std. err.) 
MAN1-99 1.631 **              
                                           (0.720)                 
MAN100 1.458 *               
                                           (0.772)                 
SHARE                0.105 *** 
                                                       (0.038)     
SHARE2               -0.096 **  
                                                       (0.038)     
GROUP    0.265        0.271     
                                           (0.656)     (0.668)     
LIAB 1.770     1.623     
                                           (1.310)     (1.306)     
CAPINT    0.007        0.006     
                                           (0.005)     (0.005)     
CF/EMP    0.008        0.007     
                                           (0.011)     (0.011)     
C1   -0.828       -0.773     
                                           (0.618)     (0.618)     
C2   -0.054       -0.017     
                                           (0.645)     (0.642)     
C3 -2.061 *** -1.955 *** 
                                           (0.649)     (0.646)     
EXPORT    0.043 ***    0.043 *** 
                                           (0.009)     (0.008)     
lnEMP 1.072     1.142     
                                           (0.931)     (0.932)     
(lnEMP)2    0.014        0.010     
                                           (0.106)     (0.106)     
AGE   -0.020       -0.017     
                                           (0.027)     (0.027)     
AGE2    0.005        0.002     
                                           (0.021)     (0.021)     
Constant -9.155 *** -9.334 *** 
                                           (2.541)     (2.557)     
Test on joint significance of industry 
dummies, χ2(10) 28.55** 26.83** 
Log-likelihood -2417.801 -2416.863 
McFadden R2 0.117 0.117 
Number of obs. 1406 1406 
Left-censored obs. 884 884 
Notes: *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%).  
Heteroscedastic standard errors are estimated by 11 industry and 4 size class dummies. 
